Abstract: This paper examines the innovation dynamics of sustainability transitions within hydrocarbon-rich countries, with a particular emphasis upon the emerging solar industries in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).In order to examine the dynamics within the current Saudi and UAE energy system and subsequently assess its potential for supporting the successful establishment of sizeable solar energy industries, a list of five structural elements and seven system functions has first been compiled from the innovation literature. Next, a comparative assessment is conducted with regard to how well each of these elements and functions is currently fulfilled in both industries. Not only does the paper reveal a number of ominous signs of structural and functional related challenges, it also provides policy orientated recommendations that have the potential to support a transition towards a sustainable future within such oil-rich countries.
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Introduction
Rapidly increasing domestic energy demand, coupled with a growing awareness of the need to diversify the energy mix and economic activities and a desire to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions have motivated major oil-producing countries to pursue a sustainable energy agenda. To that end, solar energy appears to be one of the most attractive options available for the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf region, given its high levels of solar radiation as well as large uninhabited desert areas. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are two examples of hydrocarbonrich countries, which although they have taken steps towards establishing solar energy industries, 1 diffusion of solar energy technologies has been very limited to date. Consequently, their massive solar energy potential continues to remain largely untapped.
In an attempt to examine the underlying reasons for such an underperformance, this paper compares and contrasts the dynamics within the current Saudi and UAE energy systems using the Systems of Innovation (SI) approach. It has been noted by a number of scholars (e.g. Foxon, 2003; Foxon and Pearson, 2008) that despite the attractiveness and potential analytical usefulness of the SI approach, there has been limited empirical application of SI-related frameworks to study the innovation-orientated processes of sustainability transitions (i.e. journeys to achieve a sustainable future). This paper makes use of these theoretical concepts, recently articulated within the SI field, with the ultimate aim of providing policy-making insights for promoting sustainable energy innovations in such hydrocarbon-rich countries. Moreover, the political economy framework conditions in these countries are quite unique, generally characterised by neo-patrimonialism and rentier regimes where state legitimacy derives primarily from redistribution of wealth (Schlumberger, 2004; Bank and Richter, 2010) . Hence, our study makes a first step to assess the specific challenges for systemic innovation in such an institutional environment, and opens up venues for future research. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the SI-based analytical framework that has been followed in this paper. Section 3 discusses the research methods employed and the data collection process. In Sections 4 and 5, we discuss our empirical findings in terms of the structural and functional analysis of the emerging solar energy industries in the KSA and the UAE. The latter will be supplemented with a force-field analysis of the research findings. Section 6 concludes with a summary of comparative case findings, together with some policy recommendations that have the potential to support the future development of a well-functioning solar innovation system within such oil-rich countries.
Systems of innovation as an analytical framework
The SI approach was articulated initially at the national level (i.e. National Innovation System 'NIS') in the mid-1980s by Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1992) , who were then followed by others including Edquist (1997) , Nelson (1993) and the OECD (1997) . The SI concept is essentially still emerging and its definition varies considerably, depending on the characteristics of the system being considered. For example, Freeman (1987) broadly defined the SI concept as " [t] he network of institutions in public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies" (p.3). In essence, it is argued that actors cannot innovate in isolation and that innovation is a collective and interactive process. Generally speaking, the SI approach has changed the analytical perspective on innovation from the traditional linear models (e.g. that of a 'technology push' and 'market pull' or of 'basic research -applied research -development -diffusion') to a systemic view of interaction among different actors (Edquist, 2005) . Bearing in mind the wide range of theoretical perspectives that have recently been articulated in the innovation studies field, this paper follows the SI-based approach of Al-Saleh (2010a) and Vidican et al. (2011) , who proposed studying the innovation process that takes places within the emerging renewable energy sectors -those that are essentially at an early stage of development. As shown in Figure 1 , this approach essentially involves the examination of five structural elements (actors, institutions, networks, knowledge and technologies) and seven system functions (namely entrepreneurial activities, knowledge development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of the search, market formation, resource mobilisation and creation of legitimacy). According to SI thinking, the more (and better) these structural components and functions are served, the better the development, diffusion and utilisation of innovations are likely to be. In this paper, the current status of the Saudi and UAE solar energy sectors will be compared in terms of these five structural elements and seven functions, which appear to be the most comprehensive and empirically tested set of functions in the SI literature (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008) . It should be mentioned here, that whilst the term 'actors' refers to the organisations and individuals involved in the emerging technology under consideration, 'institutions' can be defined as 'sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals, groups and organisations'. In other words, the term 'institutions' refers to both the 'social norms' as well as the 'regulations' that shape and regulate behaviour and interaction between actors (Edquist and Johnson, 1997) .The term 'networks' refers to the interactions between these actors and institutions, as networks essentially represent modes for the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge (Metcalfe, 1992) . Examples of networks are a coalition of firms, industry associations and research communities. Engaging in political networks facilitates institutional alignment, while being strongly integrated in a knowledge-orientated network increases the resource base of an actor and facilitates learning.
Research methodology
The main source of empirical data for this comparative case study is a set of semistructured interviews conducted with highly informed Saudi and UAE stakeholders. The selection criterion adopted was that an interviewee should either be directly involved in -or have an influence over the policy-making process concerning the Saudi and UAE solar energy industries. In total, 15 in-depth interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia and 26 interviews in the UAE. The interviewees were all of senior status including two Saudi princes, two members of the Saudi Consultative Council (the Shura Council) in addition to a range of solar energy business owners and senior managers working in both the Saudi and UAE public and private sectors. In order to examine the level of flow and clarity of the interviews' questions before starting the fieldwork, a pilot test was conducted -in which experts were invited to comment on a draft of the semi-structured interview guide. Rather than treating the interviews as a question and answer session, the interviewees were encouraged to express their own views and elaborate on their answers in a completely anonymous setting where no specific answer is seen as being right or wrong. With the consent of the interviewees, notes were taken during the actual interviews, all of which were also tape-recorded before being transcribed. With respect to data analysis, the findings of the interviews were analysed by identifying emerging themes, as well as figuring out similarities and differences between the responses of the Saudi and UAE interviewees. It is believed that by adopting such a qualitative approach to data analysis, one is better able to relate the individual responses to the 'big picture' set by the research objective and informed by the adopted SI-orientated analytical framework. Overall, the findings of the thirty-five interviews have provided a source of information with which to carry out structural and functional analyses, which are presented next.
Structural analysis of the Saudi and the UAE solar innovation systems
As previously shown in Figure 1 , structural analysis of any SI should entail examining five elements (i.e. actors, institutions, networks, knowledge and technologies). The following is an outline of the main potential actors in the Saudi and UAE solar energy SI, followed by a comparison in terms of key operating networks as well as the current status of knowledge, technologies and relevant institutional frameworks in both industries.
Actors

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
When asked about the most important actors, all Saudi interviewees emphasised the important role played by the KSA Government and its ministries and councils, as well as by public-led organisations. For example, among the relevant ministries mentioned during the interviews are the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Economy and Planning, Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Water and Electricity, Ministry of Higher Education as well as the Presidency of Meteorology and Environment. Other potentially relevant state-owned organisations identified include the Water and Electricity Company in addition to the Electricity and Co-Generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA), recently established to promote market competition through protecting Saudi electricity and water consumers against monopoly.
As argued by one of the research participants, "...in any monarchy, where authorities have considerable power and considerable financial resources, [establishing new industries] is entirely controllable by the authorities, and thus is a policy choice". Indeed, political support is quite often a key factor in promoting sustainable innovations, but especially so given the situation in the KSA. Another key actor identified is Saudi Aramco, whose policies and strategies are ultimately overseen by the Saudi King himself. Saudi Aramco is the national oil company that owns and controls the country's massive hydrocarbon resources on behalf of the monarchy. Whilst its core business lies in extracting and selling oil, several interviewees acknowledged the company's recent modest interest in environment friendly energy innovations, which unfortunately still excludes renewables. When one of the Aramco staff working in one of these 'green' Research and Development (R&D) departments was asked about the nature of his department, he replied that: "Saudi Aramco has always been, and will always remain, an oil company. That said, we are keen to keep a close eye on recent advances and developments in renewable energy and fuel cells. That is precisely why the company keeps sending a bunch of its staff to scientific conferences and popular 'green' events around the globe". Nonetheless, bearing in mind the government's dependence on -and hence its biased trust with regard to -the expertise of Saudi Aramco, it was interesting to note that the latter company was recently put in charge of the design and construction of two key projects: the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) and the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC). Given their potentially important role with regard to promoting sustainable energy in the KSA, it is worth shedding some light on these newly created organisations using insights that have emerged from the elite interviews.
KAUST, which was officially inaugurated in September 2009, is a both promising and interesting project in the KSA for a number of reasons. KAUST is the first graduate level research-orientated university in the country. In addition, it is an enclave, in that it is less affected by either the restrictions of highly conservative Saudi society or the inefficiencies associated with the country's higher education system. The latter include a low quality of academic teaching, poor library services and little emphasis on scholarly research activities (as indicated by Al-Sulayti, 2002; Al-Qahtani, 2004; Muysken and Nour, 2006) . Furthermore, whilst it is true that KAUST currently possesses one of the world's fastest supercomputers as well as a team of world-class scientists, criticisms have already been levied at the aggressive way in which its US$ 10 billion research endowment has been spent on salaries and scholarships. For example, KAUST recently offered a total of US$ 33 million to scientists at Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley for research into ways of making solar energy competitive vis-à-vis coal plants and developing 'green concrete', respectively. If nothing else, KAUST is not lacking in financial muscle, but the ambitions and hopes for this university tend to be much overrated in the media. As it was vividly put by one of the elite interviewees, " [i] Even if KAUST succeeds in achieving the aim of becoming a world-class university, this should not obscure the fact that the country's twenty-four other state-run universities score very low in terms of research output. Perhaps the only slight exceptions to the last statement are the three relatively old universities (namely King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, King Saud University and King Abdulaziz University), which have research offices in their campuses. It should also be noted that over the last five years, 12 new universities and colleges have opened in the KSA. One of the interviewees explained that the vast majority of the newly established Saudi universities were originally colleges that were transformed into universities, without a genuine effort thus far to upgrade their academic level. Another elite interviewee tried to justify the fact that Saudi universities are weak in terms of scholarly publications. He rightly argued that Saudi universities and colleges have only recently been established, and that their sole purpose is teaching and providing tertiary educational and vocational qualifications to the rapidly growing young Saudi population. According to some 'unpublished' official data, it is projected that the country will need around 100,000 university staff by 2030, yet it currently only has around 40,000. Hence the focus has been on quantity rather than quality. He added that: "In Saudi universities and colleges, scholarly research does not usually occupy much of the daily responsibilities of the academics". This is why the current situation is a weak contribution in terms of scholarly research. Here, it is perhaps worth acknowledging the government's recent support for and generous spending on the educational sector, which saw approximately 26% of the national budget for both fiscal years 2010 and 2011 allocated to education (Saudi Ministry of Finance, 2011) . It is also notable that the number of students enrolled in higher education has increased by 165% in one decade. One of the interviewees however, revealed that -based on the most recent official survey that has been made available by him -80% of the Saudis working in the private sector have been to neither a university nor a college.
When looking beyond academia, it is indeed disappointing to note that most Saudi firms do not possess R&D departments. As Elhmood (2003) has pointed out, 67% of Saudi firms do not have any budget put aside for R&D. In addition, there is no Ministry for Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia. Instead, the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) was founded in the capital city of Riyadh in 1977 with the aim of becoming the national science policy-making body, in addition to coordinating all R&D activities in the Kingdom. KACST, which is overseen directly by the Council of Ministers, has formulated a few national Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives, but there seem to be a variety of obstacles impeding most of them. These include the lack of bridging mechanisms between researchers and industry, insufficient R&D funding and a shortage of skilled manpower. An examination of the Saudi private sector reveals the existence of a number of small Saudi companies that -on request -can import and sell solar systems for a wide range of applications. It has emerged from the interviews that only a couple of these companies have recently obtained industrial licenses to produce solar panels and heaters locally. However, given the absence of supporting incentives from the government, there is no intention to start local manufacturing anytime soon. For the time being, these private companies continue to operate as the integrator, importer and installer of solar systems.
The other recently launched key government-led project, KAPSARC was established in 2008 by Royal Decree following a first-of-its-kind US$ 300 million pledge for climate research made by King Abdullah during the opening session of the third OPEC Summit.
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The heads of state of the OPEC countries gathered in Riyadh for a summit overshadowed by rising oil prices and criticisms that OPEC states were exploiting the needs of other countries to get rich. One of the interviewees saw the announcement of this grant as 'a desperate effort to pacify legitimate criticisms'. It is anticipated, however, that KAPSARC will soon establish itself as a world-class energy research centre 'think tank', which focuses on recent advances and studies global developments in energy and related environmental arenas, with the ultimate aim of enhancing the Kingdom's prominence in energy markets. It appears, however, as indicated by a couple of the interviewees, that given the use of the word 'petroleum' in the name of this centre, the main focus will be upon efforts to 'green' petroleum-based products as opposed to promoting other sustainable sources of energy (cf. Al-Naimi, 2010). Although participants did not elaborate further on this point, one would assume they might be referring to a focus on technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies, rather than renewables. In the cynical words of one of the stakeholders interviewed, "[t]his should not come as a total surprise given the fact that Saudi Aramco -the Government's 'pampered puppy' -was asked to manage the creation of this research centre itself". Some observers have, however, expressed some enthusiasm for the KAPSARC project after it is completed in around 2012, as Saudi Aramco will be asked to let it operate independently.
The most recent initiative, however, is the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE), which was established by a royal decree in April 2010. The announced aims of the KA-CARE are the regulation and promotion of renewable energy and peaceful uses of atomic energy in areas such as agriculture, medicine and desalination. The royal decree stated that all atomic and renewables relevant departments and administrations that were formerly established at KACST are to be transferred to KA-CARE. However, more than a year since issuing the decree, there have been considerable challenges and delays in implementing this transfer and the KA-CARE's contribution is yet to be realised.
With regard to financial actors, it is worth mentioning here that the Saudi local banks are known for their risk-averse attitude and skepticism when it comes to funding projects with expected long turnovers. Nonetheless, venture capital (of up to around US$ 500,000) can now be secured through some of the Saudi banks, provided the establishment is backed (i.e. guaranteed) by a government organisation named the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (which is only concerned with low technology projects). For energyrelated projects, there appears to be no entity that provides venture capital.
United Arab Emirates
With regard to the case of the UAE, it is important to point out that the country -as is the case with the KSA and other Gulf nations -is a monarchy that remains deeply committed to maintaining traditional tribal roles and cultural patterns. As a result, the UAE government (i.e. the ruling elite of the royal family) acts as the omnipotent decision maker, with decisions being made primarily at the highest levels of government authority. This characteristic differentiates the Gulf's governance model from many other developed and developing regions. The UAE model is slightly different as it has a relatively more inviting business environment, and hence the role and contribution of the private sector is more pronounced than is the case in the KSA. For example, it was suggested by some of the interviewees that setting up a business in the KSA is a lengthy process -normally involving petty corruption -that can take several months, as opposed to a couple of days in the UAE. It is a matter of fact that most Saudi businesses currently employ 'fixers' whose prime role is to liaise with government departments in order to secure 'routine' permissions and authorisations.
Bearing in mind the very early stage of solar industry development in the UAE, our research has contributed to identifying the baseline in terms of actors operating in the UAE solar energy industry. These research findings have allowed us to create a national database of seventy-two private companies with activities in the solar industry.
3 Most companies are concentrated downstream (e.g. design, installation, maintenance and system integration). Only four of these 72 companies currently manufacture solar products -namely solar photovoltaic (PV) cells, solar collector mirrors and solar thermal collectors. We also identified 16 consultancy companies offering various related services and four investment companies that could potentially provide funds for renewable energy initiatives. In total, 75% of the private companies identified are located in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, while the remaining 25% are scattered across the other five emirates.
The main player, by size of investment and diversity of technologies is the Masdar Initiative, which was launched by the UAE Government in 2006. With a US$ 22 billion budget, the project is driven by the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company, a subsidiary of the state-owned Mubadala Investment Company. The Masdar Initiative is made of five business units, with Masdar City being the first. This city is currently under construction, is aimed to be a carbon-neutral residential/work community and industrial and R&D cluster. The city will also host the headquarters of the newly established International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 4 The second unit of the Masdar Initiative is the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology (Masdar Institute), a graduate research university that has recently been established in collaboration with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The remaining business units of the Masdar Initiative are Masdar Carbon, Masdar Power and Masdar Venture Capital, who manage Masdar Clean Tech Funds -i.e. a series of diversified venture capital investment vehicles focused on building portfolios of direct investments in some of the worlds most promising and pioneering technologies and projects in the field of renewable energy.
Bearing in mind the potential role those universities could play in supporting the establishment of new industries (Lester, 2005; Vidican, 2009) , our research has identified a total of 32 UAE universities that offer engineering and/or S&T curriculums that could support knowledge production in the renewable energy sector. Whilst the number of universities is a positive sign, it is important to note here that the Masdar Institute is currently the only academic establishment that focuses its curriculum and research agenda on alternative energy technologies and sustainable development. It has been reported, however, that Masdar has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Education and Abu Dhabi Education Council in order to incorporate the subjects of renewables and sustainability into the UAE educational curricula (Masdar, 2009) . Moreover, the UAE University (in Al-Ain) has recently received a grant from the National Research Foundation (NRF) to create a Centre of Excellence in Water and Environment. Here, it is perhaps worth highlighting the severe lack of governmental research funding agencies in the UAE -as is the case with most Middle Eastern countries -with the recently established NRF being the potential exception. It is noted, however, that although the NRF has issued a single call for research proposals back in 2009, grants are yet to be disbursed. Another government-sponsored fund is the Sheikh Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development (in Abu Dhabi), which was set with a total capital investment of more than half a billion US Dollars. A similar initiative is the Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoom Foundation (in Dubai).There, funds are available to offer financial support to young Emirati nationals who want to start new businesses, which are not necessarily in energy-related fields. It has become apparent from the interviews conducted that, even long before the global economic crisis, solar energy companies have struggled in securing UAE-based funding to support their business. One identified reason is that UAE finance agencies were not familiar with renewables-based businesses. According to one of the interviewees, "[w]e had to teach the bank what solar meant, literally".
When considering the actors that have the potential to play a critical part in the emerging solar SI, it is of relevance to mention the utility companies. The Federal Electricity and Water Authority (FEWA) is the entity responsible for overseeing federal utilities, while three separate governmental authorities in the three major emirates (namely Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah) oversee power and water generation in their respective emirates. It has emerged from our interviews that the emirate of Fujairah is planning to build its own grid in the near future, so they will no longer be dependent on FEWA for the provision of power. Given the lack of involvement on the part of the private sector in the current UAE power market, it is hoped that the state-owned utilities would start to use solar energy technologies to generate electricity and water, and hence contribute towards developing a solar market in the country. Another potentially relevant actor is the Regulation and Supervision Bureau (RSB) (2011), which is responsible for the regulatory framework for tariff, grid ownership and a variety of overarching issues in Abu Dhabi. It appears, however, that although RSB is charged with establishing tariffs, decisions regarding these costs are made by Abu Dhabi's 18 members Executive Council (the executive authority). Therefore, we believe that unless the UAE power market is de-regulated, the role of the UAE Government -along its agencies and utilities -is of the utmost importance when considering the prospects for solar energy in this hydrocarbonrich Gulf nation.
As in the case of KSA, financial actors (who would either invest in project development or raise capital for R&D) are not widely present in the UAE; by the nature of the economy, the state is dominating this sector as well. Nevertheless, once the local market expands further, it is expected that a more diversified set of stakeholders will be present.
Having established a basic understanding of the current, and potential, actors operating within the emerging solar industries of the KSA and UAE, the remaining sub-sections compare between these two industries in terms of the remaining structural elements (i.e. institutions, networks, technologies and knowledge).
Institutions
With regard to the social norms (i.e. soft institutional factors) prevailing in the KSA and UAE, it appears that both countries have a lot in common. For example, during the interviews there was frequent reference to behavioural features of Arab culture, such as high levels of risk avoidance (and fear of blame), high centralisation of authority and high respect for authority that can inhibit creativity and the transition to an innovationbased economy in the Gulf region. In addition, many of the interviewees emphasised the incidence of 'psychological defeat'. Generally speaking, the population of Arab nations and many other developing countries lacks 'self-esteem' in local expertise and capabilities. Hence, besides the apparently underdeveloped indigenous technological innovation capabilities, there is a tendency to favour foreign talent and to rely on imported technologies (Nour, 2005) . Another theme emerging from the interviews is the prevalence of a 'strong trader mentality' which originated from traditional Arab culture (Vidican et al., 2011) . This mentality can inhibit innovation when it encourages a focus on short-term financial returns as opposed to the long-term perspective needed for achieving potential gains from R&D, entrepreneurship and for building indigenous technological capabilities in the emerging solar sector.
However, a few research participants argued that some of these cultural-orientated features, such as deference to authority, can also be positive because if top leaders strongly encourage innovation, their followers will be motivated to act accordingly. There have been numerous announcements that UAE leaders are, in fact, supportive of innovation in solar and other forms of renewable energy. Speaking about what motivates the decisions of the UAE royal family, one of the interviewees stated, " [t] hey want something which is absolutely innovative, that nobody has done before, and they don't mind about the money. They are billionaires". This is a potentially encouraging indicator, especially when bearing in mind that the UAE is committed to traditional tribal roles in which the ruling elite is the omnipotent decision maker in the country. Such findings, although originating from the interviews conducted at the UAE, have some resonance to the case of the KSA but only to a certain extent. For example, given that the KSA royal family is much larger in size, one would expect that lobbying the Saudi monarchy would require more efforts and resources.
Moreover, it has emerged that, living off 'unearned income', there has also been a tendency among the Gulf nations to import finished products, as opposed to striving to develop indigenous capabilities or training a domestic workforce. Needless to say, the 'turn-key mode' has been the basis of infrastructural development efforts (e.g. building roads, hospitals, etc.) of nation states in the Arab world, including the KSA and UAE. Essentially, the research participants asserted the existence of a prevailing 'rentier mentality', orientating itself through easy gain as opposed to developing productive and/or creative labour. Such an attitude is indeed not an ideal catalyst for developing a culture of entrepreneurship or even an industrial nation for that matter. In fact, it has been frequently argued that due to the dominance of such a rentier mentality, many KSA and UAE nationals tend to avoid jobs that require creativity and/or self-development, all of which intensifies the alarming issues of unemployment among the rapidly growing young population within these two countries -particularly in Saudi Arabia. Both countries have launched campaigns, namely Saudisation and Emiratisation, 5 in order to reduce their dependence on relatively more skilled and cheaper foreign workers. It has emerged from our interviews, however, that there is a strong preference for relatively secure government jobs at the expense of the relatively competitive private sector, which has long been viewed as being in a subservient relationship instead of being a dominant force. It has already been noted by Yackley-Franken (2007) that oil wealth has created a new generation of Saudi nationals, most of whom consider doing manual labour to be dishonourable. It is sometimes argued, however, that although an enforcement of Saudisation and Emiratisation could contribute -at least in theory -to resolving a growing unemployment problem, such efforts are not without negative consequences. These could include higher costs, lower productivity and economic inefficiencies (Cordesman, 2003) .
With regard to laws and regulations (i.e. hard institutional factors) within the Saudi and UAE energy systems, there is an apparent bias towards fossil fuels. It is almost impossible for renewable energy to compete in the Saudi and the UAE electricity sector with the current artificially low electricity prices. Not only have substantial consumer subsidies (i.e. on the end-use price) long been provided by the Gulf governments as part of their social welfare programmes, but also fossil fuel prices are extremely low (i.e. there are also substantial electricity producer subsidies) (Alnatheer, 2006; The World Bank, 2011) . For instance, bearing in mind that natural gas is globally traded at around US$ 5-8 per million BTU, the Saudi Electric Company currently buys natural gas at a fixed price of US$ 0.75 per million BTU (Al-Saleh, 2010b). According to one highly informed interviewee, who works at the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals, the annual value of total energy subsidies in the KSA exceeded US$ 66 billion in 2007. In addition, it has been reported that some of the electricity generating and desalination plants, especially in the KSA, run on very heavy fuel oils which are difficult to export due to their environmental disadvantages (Al-Shehri, 2008) .
Current domestic electricity tariffs for UAE nationals range between US$ .008/kWh and US$.013/kWh (depending upon the remoteness of the area) and US$ .041/kWh for non-nationals. Water tariffs are also low; while water is supplied free of charge to the homes of UAE nationals, foreigners are charged only US$ 2.6/TIG 'Thousand Imperial Gallons' (RSB, 2011) . Unlike the situation in the UAE, and bearing in mind the large Saudi population, electricity tariffs for Saudi nationals and foreigners are set the same. However, both Saudi and UAE tariffs do not distinguish between the time of day and time of year, nor is there any adjustment based on the customer's consumption level (Al-Ajlan et al., 2006) . Such tariffs are indeed very low when compared with other countries. For example, while highest electricity tariff chargeable in the UAE is US$ 0.04/kWh, the tariff in the USA averages around US$ 0.11/kWh -which is in turn lower than many European countries (EIA, 2010) . It is apparent that these subsidised electricity prices hinder adoption of solar technologies in the UAE. According to an interviewed Masdar associate, the current solar PV selling price results in electricity cost of around US$ 0.45-55/kWh, which is more than ten times the rate that UAE electricity users currently pay.
It is perhaps an irony, however, that although electricity tariffs are kept low, monthly bills are usually large because both KSA and UAE nationals are high electricity consumers. Among the contributing factors to the growth of electricity consumption are the industrialisation and the growing concentration of population in urban areas, which has led to an increase in the average size of dwellings and the extensive use of household appliances. Other reasons include little emphasis upon energy conservation in building codes and the flooding of the domestic market with energy inefficient electrical equipment. The situation is slightly better in the UAE, which has for example introduced a mandatory sustainable building rating system for the emirate of Abu Dhabi, named 'ESTIDAMA' (Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council, 2010). Other relevant sets of regulations are intellectual property (IP) rights, which are fundamental to motivating creativity and innovative endeavours. During the interviews conducted in Saudi Arabia, it has been mentioned that IP rights have improved since 2005 (i.e. the year of Saudi Arabia's accession to the World Trade Organization). For instance, despite slow operation when compared with international standards, patent systems are now in place in both the KSA and UAE. Furthermore, a Saudi 'trade secrets' protection law was passed in 2005, and copyright protection has also started to be tentatively enforced. Finally, it is perhaps worth acknowledging the great enthusiasm on the part of many of the interviewees with regard to the KSA's membership of the WTO, which was the result of twelve years of extensive negotiations (during which the Saudi Government had to produce 7000 pages of documentation in answer to 3400 questions) and has led to the introduction of around 42 by-laws within a four year period (Al-Saleh, 2010b). Unfortunately, however, most of the hopes expressed were centred on expanding sales of Saudi petroleum-based products to the rest of the world, and hence increasing national revenue.
Networks
Clearly, Masdar is the driving force in the development of the solar energy industry in the UAE. Our interviews suggest, however, that there is limited interaction and coordination between the different actors present in UAE solar SI (e.g. local solar companies, financiers, utilities, other government agencies and Masdar). In an effort to bridge this lack of communication and coordination, under the initial guidance of the Masdar Institute (as a neutral education and research organisation), a group of local companies came together in late 2009 to form an industry association (Emirates Solar Industry Association, 'ESIA') to promote solar energy in the region and foster closer collaboration.
On the other hand, whilst the KSA does not currently have a 'Masdar-equivalent', it appears that the newly established KA-CARE will play a similar role. With energyrelated decisions made behind closed doors, strategic decisions regarding industry development tend to lack transparency in the Gulf region. When asked about the degree of coordination of the relationships between the Saudi actors identified, the most common answer from the interviewees was: "[a] very weakly coordinated relationship indeed". Indicators identified included an underdeveloped Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure and the absence of both industry associations and R&D consortia in the KSA. 6 In fact, it was revealed that, due to the lack of interaction among Saudi academics and scholars with regard to disseminating their research findings through conference presentations and/or academic publications, a sizeable number of studies and research projects were repeated in one form or another in the KSA. On the other hand, one of the participants suggested that: " [a] ssuming that technology transfer mechanisms are essential parts of innovation systems, one needs to acknowledge the existence of the Saudi Society of Technology Development and Transfer, which was founded in 2001". It was pointed out that in the ten years since its establishment, the main achievement of this society, which now has about 200 members, has been the conducting of occasional training courses and workshops. In fact, the general view is that the performance of this small society -as well as the small number of science parks and incubators currently operating in the country-is unsatisfactory. Hence, their influence is negligible and the rather limited university-industry research activities continue to remain largely chaotic.
7 Enormous expectations are however attached to the newly created KAUST. Despite the 'physical isolation' of its campus, KAUST has established collaboration not only with the key regional actors from industry but also with renowned universities and research institutions around the world.
It is apparent that the successful establishment of renewable energy industries depends on a widespread knowledge of renewable energy technologies, as well as an awareness of recent energy and environmental concerns. An effort was therefore made to assess such consciousness during the interviews with high-level stakeholders. Whilst there seems to be a growing interest in renewable energy around the world including the UAE, it is perhaps disappointing to realise that four Saudi interviewees perceived the way energy is currently being produced and consumed as having a low priority, and seemed not to have any concerns in relation to the issue of global warming and other environmental issues. In addition, most of the Saudi interviewees were convinced that there will be enough 'reasonably priced' oil for many centuries to come. They further believed that the notion of 'peak oil' is over stressed in the western media for the sole purpose of motivating their governments to address their 'energy security' dilemmas. In fact, the two academics interviewed agreed that the vast majority of Saudi academics think that the notion of 'peak oil' is flawed because it overlooks technological, economic and regulatory evolution. Oddly enough, there was a reference during one of the Saudi interviews to a saying by the American writer Mark Twain 
to the effect that "[i]t is not what you do not know that will hurt you, it is what you think you know for
sure, but just is not so". Many of the Saudi interviewees also stated their utter disbelief with regard to the phenomenon of global warming, and suggested that no developing country should sacrifice its growth for the sake of reducing CO 2 emissions.
As clearly argued by one of the Saudi officials interviewed, "Peak oil and global warming are nothing but two politically-driven lies created by the West in order to create a market for renewable energy, and then to weaken the geopolitical stance of the Gulf...If their environmental concerns are genuine, they should stop subsidising coal-based electricity generation".
8 This is not to suggest that renewable energy means will not eventually be utilised in the KSA. Instead, the main drivers behind their adoption in the Kingdom and other oil-rich Gulf countries are likely to be different to those in oil-consuming nations.
However, the elite interviewees -as a whole -did not think that the average Saudi citizen is currently aware of the need for, let alone the potential economic, environmental and social benefits of such sustainable energy innovations. The reasons suggested for this apparent lack of awareness include the fact that the subject of renewables does not currently receive adequate attention on Arabic media channels or within Saudi educational curriculum's. It is such channels for transferring knowledge (i.e. 'networks' in innovation studies vocabulary) that -if properly utilised -can potentially influence the perception of what is desirable among the actors within an innovation system. Drawing on the poor perception in general of the importance of research and innovation, one of the research participants conceded that: "It is unfortunate that research and innovation have never been a prime element of our educational system...We grew up viewing research as a luxury rather than as a necessity".
Knowledge
It appears that all knowledge indicators -including authored books, scholarly publications, television channels, internet access and registered patents -point to a knowledge deficit in the Arab world in general. Discouraging indicators which have been reported in the literature (e.g. Arab Science and Technology Foundation, 2010; The World Bank, 2010) include a modest number of patents, a limited number of local scientists working in R&D, and a severe lack of R&D funding with an almost absent contribution from the private sector.
Considering the case of the KSA, nonetheless, the Saudi Government has recently expressed its interest in developing a knowledge-based society. This is manifested in the allocation of over a billion US dollars to establish a system of e-governance, as well as the creation of a Saudi Ministry of Communication and Information Technology in 2003. A growing number of ambitious knowledge-based plans have recently been announced by different actors in the KSA. Amongst the most notable moves is that of King Saud University, whose Rector put it quite elegantly when he said "...We -in KSU -will not only be King Saud University, but also the Knowledge Society University". Whilst the university now hosts a number of promising activities, much has yet to come if the university is serious about fulfilling its stated vision of 'becoming a leading enabler of a dynamic and prosperous knowledge society'. Moreover, the Saudi Arabian Knowledge Economy Corporation was recently established to enable the transformation of Saudi Arabian society into a knowledge-based society in the coming ten years or so. The main objective of this newly created corporation is to collect, manage and sort existing data, as well as to gather statistical data from all Saudi sectors. This is indeed an important step in terms of addressing the absence of updated and reliable data banks, which is the major challenge that faces any empirical researcher with an interest in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, a few interviews further revealed that King Abdullah has instructed a think tank, namely the Al-Aghar Group for Strategic Thinking, to undertake a study on ways to transform the country into a knowledge-based society. The Al-Aghar group organised the first conference of its kind under the motto 'Towards a Knowledge Economy' in January 2008. The conference aimed at introducing and promoting dialogues on possible ways to build a knowledge-based economy in the region (Al-Saud, 2008) . It is worth mentioning here that an application to host a conference in Saudi Arabia tends to be a lengthy bureaucratic process and has eventually to be approved by the King himself.
A few research participants have argued that the main 'tipping point' towards a national knowledge-based society is the recent inauguration of KAUST.
9 However, another interviewee concluded that the fact that the government asked Saudi Aramco to oversee the building of the KAUST campus -[which was eventually carried out with the help of foreign talent] -is definite proof, not only that the country's confidence and capabilities are still profoundly reliant on oil, but also of the fact that the country's efforts in terms of economic diversification and industrial development have not yet been sufficiently successful over the years. However, one research participant suggested that Aramco was selected, regardless of the nature of its business, simply because it is 'the most efficient Saudi machine with the least corruption'.
In terms of solar-related knowledge, some practical knowledge and experience was developed through two major R&D joint ventures with the USA ('SOLERAS Programme' that lasted from 1977 to 1987) and Germany ('HYSOLAR Programme' that lasted over the period [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] . Since then however, apart from what is hoped from the newly created KAUST and KA-CARE, both R&D activities and the assessment of domestic renewable energy resources have largely been halted in the KSA. This does not suggest an absolute absence of some technical knowledge amongst a rather limited number of Saudi actors (e.g. the few private firms that import, install and maintain solar systems). Drawing from their own involvement with the HYSOLAR programme, a couple of the Saudi elite interviewees admitted that the programme had failed in achieving its intended aim of transferring know-how and technology in the solar energy field. A major contributing factor identified is poor 'absorptive capacity' (a notion originally articulated at the firm-level by Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) , i.e. that Saudi scientists lacked -and still lack -appropriate technological capability-building capacity to produce or integrate the transferred technologies themselves. However, the most frequently mentioned reason was discontinuation of KSA government interest -and hence support -after the termination of the HYSOLAR programme for a period of more than a decade. The government's interests seem to have revived only over the past three years or so. With regard to the public awareness of energy-related matters, it has emerged from our interviews that the vast majority of Saudi citizens hold the view that oil in Saudi Arabia will last forever, and that the rest of the world envies them and conspires to come up with alternative sources of energy. If truth be told, such a naive view should not come as a total surprise, given apparent ignorance of the basics of energy due to the monarchy's total control over education and the media. The latter factor may have also contributed towards developing a very secretive culture among the previously identified small number of actors in the energy sector.
As in the KSA, ambitious plans (e.g. as part of the UAE Vision 2021 and Abu Dhabi's Economic Vision 2030) have recently been announced to develop a knowledgebased economy in the UAE (The Government of Abu Dhabi, 2008) . While these plans are a positive sign, the solar-related knowledge base is still notably inadequate. Without having solid proof, some of the interviewees suggested that given the relatively relaxed immigration and entry visa requirements, more solar energy experts currently work in the UAE than in the KSA. However, our research revealed that, at present, a wider solarrelated knowledge base hardly exists amongst the indigenous population in the UAE. This could be seen as a reflection of problems in the development of a wider scientific knowledge base across the region. Knowledge with regard to solar energy is expected to increase, however, with the establishment of the Masdar Institute (in the UAE) and KAUST (in the KSA), both of which began teaching their renewables-orientated postgraduate curricula in 2009. Moreover, bearing in mind the considerable financial resources of these oil-rich countries, it has been suggested that engaging in international knowledge and technology sourcing seems a viable catching-up opportunity for knowledge development. A comparative analysis of the knowledge base in terms of renewable energy in both countries will be provided later in this paper, when looking into the functions of knowledge development and diffusion.
Technologies
Given the availability of vast solar radiation, both solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal technologies were frequently mentioned as potential 'theoretical' candidates for both the KSA and the UAE. Another factor that increases the attractiveness of exploiting solar energy is that the electrical peak load period in the Gulf is between 12 noon and 5 p.m. (such a curve in demand almost matches the peak output curve of solar energy). Among the potential solar applications identified are large-scale PV and CSP (Concentrated Solar Power) plants, residential rooftop PV panels, solar water heaters, solar cooling systems, PV-powered cathodic corrosion protection and solar telecommunication systems (i.e. solar power for GSM 'Global System for Mobile communications' telecom towers) in remote areas. 10 In addition, there has been a tentative mention of solar-hydrogen energy systems (in which hydrogen -as an energy carrier -is produced by using solar power), and then possibly exporting the product to other countries.
One of the informal insights that emerged from a highly-informed interviewee concerned the Global Strategic Studies Institute (GSSI), which has recently been established as the first Saudi Arabian environmental non-governmental agency. It was reported that the GSSI has recently been active in lobbying to build a huge Saudi solar farm, whose land area would be twice that of the Masdar city project being built in Abu Dhabi. Nonetheless, since the idea was not well received in the Saudi business community, GSSI has eventually decided to oversee the realisation of this (rather vague in detail) project itself in the future. However, it has emerged from the interviews that the Saudi leadership holds the view that the KSA should heed to the lessons learned from the development of the Saudi's mining industry -one of the main lessons being that neither the private sector nor foreign companies can be counted on to act in the KSA's best strategic interests. Therefore, it was suggested that direct, sovereign investment is most viable to develop the solar energy industry in the KSA. Similar views were reported during the UAE interviews, but there seem to be more expectations attached to a potential role for the UAE's private sector.
During the interviews, there has been an overwhelming scepticism that the Gulf nations might be able to indigenously produce renewable energy technologies themselves. For example, it was argued that although KSA has long been a country with one of the highest ratios of military and security expenditure to GDP, it has never succeeded in building its own arms and munitions industry. Moreover, it was pointed out that after more than 70 years, the hydrocarbon-rich Middle Eastern nations still rely on foreign technologies and expertise in their oil industries. Bearing in mind the underdeveloped technological status and solar-related manufacturing capabilities, reliance on foreign expertise is seen as critical for the emerging stage of the solar sector in the KSA and the UAE.
On the market development side, it seems that solar power applications have to date been very limited. With the absence of statistics detailing the installed solar power capacity is in this part of the world, Table 1 points out the most notable solar energy applications to date. Table 1 An overview of main solar projects in the KSA and the UAE
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
A 2 MW rooftop solar PV power plant has recently been installed on the northern and southern laboratories of the KAUST campus. At present, this is the largest solar project in the KSA.
A large solar PV array has recently been built at Masdar City. With an installed capacity of 10MW, this PV (50% thin film; 50% poly crystalline) plant is the largest grid-connected solar power plant in the Middle East region. As a part of the SOLERAS programme, the 'Solar Village Project' was installed in 1982 and it is currently partially operational. With an output of only 350 kW, this project was the world's largest solar PV project at that time.
A 1 MW PV rooftop installation has been installed at the Masdar Institute. To sum up, our structural analysis of the KSA and UAE solar energy sectors reveals that despite the existence of a few promising indicators and ambitious plans (especially in the case of the UAE), the structural elements of both solar SIs do not yet seem to be strongly linked nor are their efforts sufficiently coordinated. In addition, the knowledge and indigenous technological capabilities in the field of solar energy are under-developed. Hence, there is a need to bring these structural components together to function as an integrated system. Having established a basic understanding of the structural elements of the SIs under consideration, the next section analyses their innovation functionality.
Functional analysis of the Saudi and the UAE solar innovation systems
In our functional analysis, based on the findings that have emerged from our in-depth interviews, we initially focus on mechanisms that could either promote or inhibit the development of a supporting SI (Table 2) , and then we examine the relative strength of the main policy-orientated mechanisms (Figure 2 ) before exploring possible reinforcing cycles that could facilitate the establishment of well-functioning solar sectors in both countries (Figure 3) . Both countries suffer from: strong vested interest in fossil fuels; lack of confidence with regard to renewable energy technologies amongst the general public; lack of renewables-related curricula at both school and university levels; and increased interest in developing nuclear energy Given the preceding analysis, it would be inappropriate to claim that a full fledged solar energy innovation sector currently exists in either the KSA or the UAE. The structural and functional analyses of these slowly emerging sectors have highlighted a number of ominous signs of weakness (which can be regarded as 'blocking' and/or weak 'inducement' mechanisms). Here, it is useful to visualise the various forces interacting to oppose (i.e. block) or support (i.e. induce) the transition towards renewables in both countries. One way of achieving this visualisation is by conducting a force-field analysis, which involves a technique first introduced by Kurt Lewin in the 1950s. Such an analysis, a simple and flexible tool for identifying the driving and restraining forces for change in a given situation, and quantifying their significance, is widely used in the academic field of change management (Miner, 2005) . Nevertheless, since it would be impossible to consider all possible inducement and blocking mechanisms, care was taken to only include the key policy-orientated factors that have consistently emerged during both the KSA and the UAE interviews. As shown in Figure 2 , each mechanism is scored in terms of strength (using a numerical scale from 1 = weak-5 = strong) and then ranked for visual comprehension. For the purpose of this exercise, judging the strength of the respective mechanisms -and hence the decision to include them in figures -is based on our understanding of the status quo as a result of the comprehensive empirical research conducted in both countries and our interpretation of the research findings.
The force-field analysis suggests that since the blocking mechanisms are currently much stronger than the inducement mechanisms, the widespread diffusion of solar energy technologies is not currently viable in either country. Apparently, when compared to the case of the KSA, the situation in the UAE is relatively better suited to promoting solar-related innovations, and hence ultimately a national solar energy industry is more likely to flourish in the UAE. However, for both countries, the biggest show-stopper appears to be 'strong carbon lock-in', which essentially refers to the institutional and technological lock-in to current carbon-intensive, fossil fuel-based energy systems. For instance, during the elite interviews, there was frequent mention of the large subsidies for fossil fuel-based electricity generation in the Gulf. Such subsidies essentially 'lock-out' the development of new, particularly sustainable, energy technologies, which typically have high unit costs and have yet to benefit from scale economies and learning effects.
One could argue that policy should focus on remedying poor functionality, i.e. either through adding/increasing the strength of inducement mechanisms or removing/reducing the force of the blocking mechanisms that have such a pervasive effect. An attempt has been made to address these needs through exploring ways in which positive interactions between various systemic functions could lead to 'virtuous cycles' in the process of change that could eventually lead to the building of a momentum-creating process of creative destruction within the incumbent systems (Al-Saleh, 2010b) . Based on the findings emerging from the thirty-five in-depth interviews, Figure 3 shows potential virtuous cycles that are likely to work for the cases of the KSA and the UAE. In essence, it was suggested that the most feasible route for stimulating the diffusion of solar energy in both countries appears to be a top-down approach -i.e. the most preferred method for implementing change in Arab culture. More specifically, our research suggests that an effective starting point would be for the Saudi and UAE government to set time-bound targets for adding a specific percentage of solar power to their national grids. Thinking in terms of the SI function-based theoretical framework, such an action would be referred to as Guidance of the Search. Whilst the Government of Abu Dhabi has already set a 7% RPS target by 2020, it should be recognised that this is neither a legally binding target nor is it a federal target for the whole of the UAE. Nevertheless, one needs also to recognise that the setting of such targets by the Saudi and UAE governments is not the only way forward (or a universal panacea) as the range of possibilities for any innovational activity is constantly changing in a way that cannot be predicted in great detail. Indeed, when it comes to policy-making, one cannot overemphasise the futility of believing that 'one size fits all'. Bearing in mind that policy-making remains by and large a rough process of successive experimentation, no empirical study can provide 'definite' policy answers in the context of such an uncertain world.
Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the potential establishment of sizeable solar energy industries within oil-rich countries, via the examination of the cases of the KSA and the UAE. Since there have only been a limited number of studies about the prospects for sustainable energy, which have been drawn upon theoretical concepts that have recently been articulated within the field of innovation studies, it was decided to base the empirical part of this paper on the dominant theoretical concepts related to the structural elements and functions of SI. The integration of these theoretical concepts is, on its own, a contribution to the sustainability literature. As part of this work, a comparative assessment has been conducted to investigate how well each of the structural elements and systems functions is currently fulfilled in the emerging Saudi and UAE solar energy industries. Our empirical investigation has revealed the prevalence of several ominous signs of structural and functional-related weaknesses and a few positive indicators. Moreover, whilst the prospects for solar energy within both countries seems to have been affected by a quite similar set of policy-oriented factors, the strength of these driving and inducement mechanisms differ. In general, the case of the UAE appears to have been affected by stronger inducement mechanisms and weaker blocking mechanisms than those currently affecting the KSA.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that both hydrocarbon-rich countries are facing serious policy challenges that need to be addressed simultaneously rather on a piecemeal basis in order to develop a supporting SI that could facilitate the successful development of their national solar industries. In effect, a forward-looking, clear and sustained policy commitment is undoubtedly the key to developing a supportive innovation system, stimulating demand for renewables, enhancing market growth and making it easier for potential developers to obtain finance.
It is true that the vast majority of countries around the world have not yet put in place regulatory and policy frameworks to induce investment in renewables, but the situation is further complicated within the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf nations where massive subsidies for conventional fuels make it difficult for more sustainable energy technologies to compete. The political economy defined by neopatrimonial regimes (Schlumberger, 2004) and rentier relationships brings various challenges to reforming energy subsidies. Such a process entails the formation of new coalitions of interests and a change in the social contract (Vidican, 2012) . It is, therefore, suggested that policy-makers need to set time-bound targets for solar penetration and at the same time they must give due consideration to the phasing-out of subsidies that currently favour incumbent technologies, and, at a later stage, they could consider setting a price for carbon in order to reflect external costs to the environment, and ultimately remove imperfections in their energy markets. Nevertheless, given the hydrocarbon wealth in these two countries (and the larger Gulf region) the urgency for, or the realistic expectation that fossil-fuel subsidies will be removed is lower as compared to other rentier states in the MENA region, where revenues from natural resources are limited or non-existent (Vidican, 2012) . Under these circumstances, and given the need for a long-term energy and climate strategy, future research should consider assessing strategic approaches for expanding the role of solar power into the energy system and supporting the development of an innovation system around this sector in hydrocarbon-rich countries. Our study makes a first attempt in this direction, by highlighting the challenges that systemic innovation encounters in the context of rentier regimes, where the state is the main recipient of revenues, which it further redistributes to maintain its legitimacy. 
Notes
1
Given the emerging nature of the renewable energy sector in both the UAE and KSA, we decided to focus on the solar sector more broadly, including both solar photovoltaic and concentrated solar power technologies. Solar energy is particularly interesting to examine in the region, given the high levels of solar insolation, while the wind resource is more limited (DLR, 2005) . 2
This grant was originally dedicated to create a fund aimed at investing in technological solutions and the protection of the environment, with a focus on Carbon Capture and Storage technologies. The UAE, Qatar and Kuwait each supported it with US$ 150 million. 3
Prior to this study there was no list of companies that are active in the solar sector in the UAE (either as distributors of products, system integrators, manufacturers or other activities).
Having compiled this database, we were able to bring all companies together for a workshop, presenting results from our research, providing a platform for networking and communication, which led to also facilitating the process of forming a solar industry association. Therefore, future studies could also benefit from easier access to such information. 4 IRENA is an intergovernmental organisation that aims to promote a rapid transition towards widespread and sustainable use of renewable energy worldwide. Although IRENA had 148 signatories by May 2011, KSA was not among them. It is interesting to note though that announcements were made at the World Future Energy Summit 2010 that the joining of the KSA was imminent. 5
These terms refer to the national policies in KSA and UAE by which the government aims to increase the participation of local labour force (Saudi and Emirati nationals, respectively) in the workforce. Such policies entail specific employment targets to be fulfilled by the public and private sectors. 6 According to Berman (1990) , R&D consortia or 'research clubs' usually involve direct competitors pooling their resources in order to pursue R&D related to fairly long-term projects. The underlying aims of such collaborative efforts are to improve the technological competitiveness of the member firms, and/or to speed up the development and diffusion of new technologies.
7
A promising initiative launched by the KACST is known as BADIR programme for technology incubation. BADIR-ICT is the first national technology incubator, and there are plans to establish other BADIR affiliate technology incubators. 8
In essence, it is argued that providing subsidies for coal-based power-generation in many oilconsuming nations contradicts their publicly expressed concern for the environment. It is perhaps worth mentioning here that coal -which is not known to exist in the Gulf -is the most abundant and widely distributed fossil fuel in the world. Bearing in mind that the world's proven reserves of coal greatly exceed conventional and unconventional oil and gas reserves, it is estimated -at current global consumption rates -that coal will last for at least 138 years (EIA, 2009). 9
The 'tipping point' is a sociological term that was introduced by Malcolm Gladwell in his best seller entitled The Tipping Point: How Little things Can make a Big Difference. According to Gladwell (2000) , the term refers to the "moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point" (p.12). 10 With regard to solar heaters for domestic use, it has been proposed to consider forced closedtype solar water heating systems, comprising a special metallic absorber for flat plate collectors and a hydraulic press for bulk manufacturing. On the other hand, a solar cooling system based on the use of vapour absorption chillers fired by hot water at less than 100C using flat plate collectors, seems as an attractive option for commercial applications such as supermarkets and theatres.
